

DRAWING ON THE POSTCOLONIAL READING OF EUROPE'S QUANDARY ON THE MUSLIM(S) AT HOME

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Abstract

For the past thirty years Europe faces tumultuous counter action that appears to threaten the normative ideal of European institution. Driven by the call of recognition and acknowledgement, post-colonial migrants have posed a question on the basic presumption that bound European societies for long. Approach to assimilation, integration and multicultural society, appears to be inadequate to appeal migrants submit in the mainstream value. Demographically, ideologically and mythically threatening, Muslims are at the most part stand affront the greater challenge for European culture. The paper tries to bring to light the discourse that set this threat appearance come into being in European public sphere. Taking post-colonial on loan of description, the paper claim to overview the need to re-course the relations between Muslims and Europe, and the way discourse on Islam can be practiced in between.

Key words: *discourse, European institution, migrant, Muslim, post-colonial*

INTRODUCTION

Modern European institutions, seen in the formation of the nation states—organics in political, economic, and social organization—is highly acclaimed as the foundation of authority, which mark the establishment of current international relations. This long standing tradition has been becoming the exemplar of many states around the world to take on board. The nationalism movement, partly the brainchild of European Enlightenment, has given impetus to the colonized people aspiring for their national self-determination and self-government. Despite the bitter experiences of having been colonized, most of the post-independent states tried to emulate the archetype modernity of European institution. This demonstrates the historical trajectory of, and the continual relations between, Europe and the colonized subjects.

The historical trajectory and the unbroken relations between Europe and the colonized subjects, however, can hardly be seen in a linear and a single attitude, given that history assigns lot modalities of participatory. Once being burden in the exterior homeland of Europe, the colonized subject has now been occupying the interior home of Europe through migration process. This defying route poses a griming challenge of Europe to preserve their venerable institution in the presence of Other. Stained by issues of ethno-racial outsider, Muslims migrants apply for Europe's special heed in anticipating the issue of the constitutive Other. This paper aims to mark out the focus of discussion on the boisterous relations between Europe and their Muslims migrants, in loan from the post-colonial perspective.

This paper breaks away from the colonialist held position over Muslims, that

keenly present their arguments by emphasizing the peril Muslim (instead of Muslims) character. Despite its narrowness, this predisposition has found its way through extremist exhibitions in the public arena which is, not only threatening, but also sacrificing the life of civilians. This paper also flees from the anti-colonialist standpoint, which tries to assail the Europe for the problem inherited by colonization. Taking an alternative, this paper wants to run ahead of the two poles of extreme. Post-colonial perspective will be on loan to help reading and expounding the problem in the relationship between Muslims migrants in Europe.

The reading is to be based on the outsiders' viewpoint of Europe and of the relation between Muslims and Europe. Lack of empirical observation, this study plainly refers to Muslims and Europe in a broad sense of understanding, without any particular suggestion. Deficient of experiential investigation, this study is aimed at understanding the contemporary Muslims-Europe relation, which is conducted through a reading on the discourse of their past and present connection. The discussion of the paper will be divided into three parts. The first part discuss over the historical antecedent of Muslims encounter with Europe. The second part discuss about the trend of bulking Muslims migration in Europe and the discourses around Muslims presence in European public sphere. Yearning for the main discussion, the last part corroborate the previous two discussions into a post-colonial reading of the present situation faced by Muslims migrants in Europe and the translation of the legacy of their association.

DISCUSSION

Muslims and Europe: First Encounter

Muslim world and Europe has a long

tradition to share between their kingdoms. Muslim world was founded on the caliphates rule, derived from the revelation of Islamic teaching, while Europe was founded on the Christendom reign, derived from the revelation of Christianity, secondary to Judaist tradition; both ensuing from the genesis of Abraham. While they are sharing historical lineage of canonical birth, their earthly formation were built on vilification of each other. Fail to remember the other-half naration; the overwhelming narrative is the contour which outlines the memories on how relations arise between them. Out of this narrative, Muslims and Europe are bounded in a relation, based upon the foundation of conflict and distrust (Wharton, 2008).

The modern European society was demarcated by the historical evolution of Europe's border to resist Muslims' unfriendliness. European civilization, composed of myriad bases of European identities, is also differentiated by its geographical and cultural exclusion of the Islamic Other. The marriage of myth and historical experience, which underpins the establishment of modern Europe was based on the struggle against Islamic threat and Muslims enmity. The 1453 Ottoman siege of Vienna and the Spanish Reconquista have been playing a profound pattern of Europe's and Muslims' psyche and perception of identity, in reprisal (Wharton, 2008).

Despite the projection of their cyclical rise and downfall turn, it is Europe who is now recognized as the heir of the modern world, while the Muslim world is lightyears behind. European success to flee from the Medieval Age started the downturn episode of European civilization, while leaving Muslim world into its decadence. In early 19th century, the Napoleon exposition to Egypt was a sign of the decay of the Muslims world. Gallantry on one side, systematic colonization

was started to instill on the other side and began the elongated epoch of colonialism. The subjugation of Muslim world in face of Europe is epitomized in the narrative of Orientalism, a plague that most Muslims assume with angst.

Even after the establishment and growth of the nation-state and the supranational body which necessitates the basic requirement of sovereignty and international cooperation, there is constant raw memories and rage aversion between Muslims and Europe. While one sees the Other as a White men's burden, another sees the Center as parasitic. There is not enough breathing space in all the more situation of fortifying current politic and economy. Bent by their colonial inheritance, it leaves the world in a predetermined mode of the West and the Rest, the First World and the Third World, the Developed countries and the Least Developed countries, the active Self and the carbon copy of the passive Other. Myth of one's superiority is a dilute idea of one's inferior, where in between stretch out the symbolical stamp of Islam from which it exhibits the curtailed dialectical mode of reference: primitive, passé, and defunct vs. aloof, swollen, and conspicuous.

Muslims Migrants and Muslim Representation in European Public Sphere: Second Encounter

The flow of Muslims migration in Europe has actually begun at the end of the Second World War. Around this period was the initial era of decolonization, when influx of migrants came from former colonized countries to former colonizing countries. Important to mention here were migrants from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia who came to France; migrants from Pakistan to Great Britain; and migrants from Indonesia to Netherlands.

Another influx of Muslims migrations

took place during the 1960s and the 1970s, which was facilitated by bilateral agreements between Western European countries, such as Germany and France, and Mediterranean countries. Along this trajectory, the continuing arrival of refugees, political exiles, and asylum seekers from predominantly Muslims countries had served to increase the Muslims population in Europe. Civil war or political conflicts in former colonized countries out of the nation-building experimentations over the contention of democratic/authoritarian and secular/divine rule have added the necessities of European world as a space of haven for political émigré. Nowadays, various types of Muslims migrants come to Europe, including students, businesspeople, and highly skilled workers (Anspaha, 2008).

Set their foot for long in Europe, Muslims has created a route for their cultural identity in the adopting European countries. The identity of Muslim(s) was merely perceived as cultural characteristics during the 1960s, the 1970s, and even the 1980s. In this sense, Islam was regarded as "a set of religious practices and beliefs that were often viewed, either implicitly or explicitly, as inhibiting the integration of immigrants into Western European societies" (Adamson, 2006). Omitting religion, nationalities drew their marker of difference as foreigners, immigrants, or guestworkers, in European societies. It was only after the 1990s, the emblem of Islam acquired high level of resonance in European countries.

There were many discussions on the issue of why Islam had gained more significance after the 1990s. Most of the discussion draws their explanation by linking this idea with the transformation of geopolitical developments, which in actual fact has happened since late in 1970s. Although the trend did not seem to trail into particular route, but there was a nuance of political

Islam (*sic*), which was drifted between feats on state governance and economic development, at the one hand, with the impression on Muslim's political belligerencies and cultural hostilities, at the other hand. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the emergence of oil exporting Muslim countries, the Palestinian Intifada, and, later, the Chechnya Revolution demonstrates the emblematic power of Islamist (*sic*) ideology in concrete political and economic spheres. The kidnapping and killing of Israelis at the Munich Olympics, the 1979 Iranian hostage taking, the 1981 assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Anwar Sadat by Muslim fundamentalist, the 1980s hostage takings and executions of Westerners in Beirut, and the Gulf War, all contributed to the reawakening of a historical pattern on Muslim antagonism (Anspaha, 2008; Gallick, 2005; Wharton, 2008).

While Muslims outside Europe seemed to be increasingly fundamentalist and violent, Muslims migrants inside Europe appeared to be making more demands on the basis of their Muslims identities (Bleich, 2006). This is especially strident among second and third generation Muslims in Europe. They purported Islam as cultural identity that structures their religious beliefs and practices, from which political mobilization squirted. Muslims assert their collective, cultural, subsistence through the discourse practice that increasingly structuring debates surrounding immigrant incorporation within the larger European societies (Maxwell, 2006). The thing is, Islam has no root in the structure of cosmopolitan Europe, which derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Islam was once excavated from Europe through the re-settlement of the Church power and, henceforth, Islam did not have any place in modern European history (McCrea, 2007).

A. Muslims in United Kingdom

United Kingdom (UK) is long rejoiced for its successfulness in developing 'laissez-faire' multiculturalism toward migrants at home, but the violent exhibition by Muslims migrants fanatics during the 2005 and 2006 has created a debate whether there has been a gulf of problems that fails to address. The growing disparities between Muslims migrants soars the lack of confidence among Muslims subgroups to blend in the British society and entrap them to deviant activities against the majorities (Anspaha, 2008; Gallis, 2005).

Muslims in the UK had three times the unemployment rate, the lowest economic activity rate, a higher proportion of unqualified working age individuals, and a higher concentration in deprived residential areas. Feeling of social alienation, cultural disenfranchisement, and political discrimination in a society that does not fully accept them, provides a hotbed for breeding the ground of radical thought among young Muslims in UK. Supplemented by sympathy to the suffering experiences of Muslims abroad and Western countries' self-seeking interests of unjust foreign policies, these native born Muslims migrants help galvanizing insularity overt to the extreme activities. The 2005 London attacker were born in Britain and all of the 25 suspects in the 2006 airline bombing plot were also home grown extremists (Anspaha, 2008; Gallis, 2005; Wharton, 2008).

Many Muslims shares the view that the war on terror as a war on Islam, even those living within the Muslim countries themselves. Blair government has been accused of making a wrong decision on going to war with the United States. The falsehood that lay ground for the war cause and the loss created by the war to the elimination of Islamic heritage conservation, as in the case

of Baghdad museum, has profoundly inflicted an interior conflict with Muslims in UK.

A March 2004 opinion poll, composed of 500 British Muslims respondents, found that more than two-thirds believed that British anti-terrorist laws were being used unfairly against Muslims communities. Although UK officials insisted that police authorities would not employ a racial profiling and that the stop-and-search policy was strictly intelligence-led, but people of color were widely exposed as target. The shoot-to-kill guidelines, initially issued to police in 2002, came to be a furor after a London police killed a 27-year old Brazilian whom they mistakenly believed as a suicide bomber (Anspaha, 2008; Gallis, 2005; Wharton, 2008).

B. Muslims in Netherlands

In Netherlands, the posting of a 15-minute film called 'Fitna' by a right-wing Dutch legislator, Geert Wilders, on the maverick video-sharing website liveleak.com on March 27 2004, sparked another storm, dispersed from the national, the continental, and to the most Muslims terrains. The film, begins and ends with one of the twelve controversial Danish cartoons, links the cut verses of the Koran with images and audio of recent attacks by Muslim fundamentalists, pictures of September 11 attack's victims, the beheading of a man by masked gunmen, the shot of a Muslim women draped in burqa, and the video of a call for 'jihad' from Muslim clerics. Wilder himself confessed that the film lucidly explain the fascist nature of the Koran since it incites people to commit violence. He alleged that muslim threaten the survival of European population and democratic institution. Wilder himself is known for his political stance against migration and naturalization law of Muslims in Europe (Gallis, 2005; Saidazimova, 2008).

Besides Wilder, the voice of anti-integration with Muslims migrants may also be seen through right-wing groups. In street level alone, there is a steeping decline in the acceptance of cultural diversity among the population. The regular surveys held by the Social and Cultural Planning Office, for instance, shown the severe climate of opinion regarding migration's assimilation, and the increasing pattern violence among migrants and non-migrant populace. The killing of film maker Theo van Gogh on November 2 2004 in Amsterdam led to a public outcry, which embarked a countrywide series of assaults against mosques and Muslim schools. This social unrest shows "the pre-existing social and political instability in a society apparently in search of a new identity" (Entzinger, 2006).

In Netherlands, integration is defined in terms of migrants' loyalty to and identification with Dutch values and norms, instead of migrants' social and institutional participation. This is partly a result of the changing strategy in Netherlands' integration, which was formerly based on the conception of "living apart together" through the preservation of communities cultural identity while, in respect of sovereignty, maintaining amities amid the populace into the imposition of national historical and cultural digestion over migrants. This imposition exhibits in a number of ways, such as the mandatory integration courses, which is at cost. In earlier times, this course was offered free of charge by the local government (Entzinger, 2006; Gallick, 2005).

Currently, in line with the free market ideologies, it is migrant's own responsibility to find a course, to register and to pay for it, and, eventually, to qualify for a mandatory language-and-culture test that has to be taken within five years after the initial settlement in the Netherlands. Those who fail to pass the test will

be fined and will be disqualified from permanent settlement. Departing from its deliberate manner, naturalization becomes a sentence, summarized by fine and sanction. Although the ruling is laid on economic basis, that is to promote migrants that able to correspond with labor market condition, it is also a reflection of a systematic mechanism to curb the flow of migrants coming to Netherlands, let alone acquiring Dutch nationality. The result shows, as easily predicted, the plunge of the number of migrants naturalized (Entzinger, 2006; Van Oers, 2008).

Bold steps taken by the government has inflicted confrontation among migrants for having put under pressures. Along with the implementation of Dutchness test for immigrants, the banning of the burqa in public spaces, the reduction of visas approved for imported brides of arranged marriages, have rather than curb ethnic tensions, earned volatile exposure of more violence (Entzinger, 2006).

C. Muslims in French

The separation of church and the state is what has instituted the modernization in French since the 19th century in which religion is domesticated in order to establish a Republican ideal. French embrace "*laïcité*" as the principle of French life. "Laïcité" is not simply secularism, but the balancing of religious freedom and public order. The government protects freedom of religious and, at the same time, ensures that religious groups do not engage in political activism disruptive of public life (Gallick, 2005).

In place of the ancient regime of religion, French modernization rests on human capacities in reason, scientific activities, and technological invention for the advancement of human life. Based on the pet project of French Enlightenment, modern French society is built in opposition

to whatever seen as backward or pre modern institution, like feudalism and religion. Through a historical series of corruptive dominance under the feudal lords, French regards Noble institution as primeval bases for an old regime that need to be stored in the past. They substitute the role of religion as the bases of social norms in forms of new religion of humanity, which finds the new authority in science in order to emancipate men from reason-shackling superstitions. The sacred appellation of liberty, equality, and fraternity are French modernist catapult deem to be applied suitably to everyone (Gouldner, 1975).

The universalistic tag of liberty, equality, and fraternity, has been built on the monocultural basis of French experience, and is canonically employed in the new generated amalgamating society. The disparities grew wider between societies in view of late capitalistic life, fused with globalization, has cast doubt on the relevance of the French's liberty, equality, and fraternity. The liberty is no longer sound in face of the rights to express individual uniqueness and distinctiveness. There cannot be liberty when dictation is put into operation to control how people articulate their beingness through cultural emblems.

The equality is invalid before the segregation that transpires through the housing seclusion and the non-representation of Muslims' personal in French public authorities. The 2005 riots in Paris' suburbs, Lyons, Toulouse, Lille and other cities, inhabited by North Africans', where unemployment are high and educational levels are low. According to 2005 CRS Report, these suburbs are a society apart, their inhabitants cut off from most of the opportunities afforded French youths who are not Muslim. The rioting has largely taken the form of violence against poverty. The sense of powerlessness due to

economic source and access of limitation, create a state of anguish and alienation among French-born children of immigrants, from which large of the percentage are Muslims (Gallis, 2005).

Henceforth, the fraternity is null before the actual presence of opportunities for personal welfare and, equally, community's cultural subsistence. French irrecognition of religion to equip human with growth and development is in contrast to the traditional belief of Muslims that sees religion as organically embedded in all aspects of human life. Henceforth, when dealing with Muslims migrants, French modernistic venture proves insufficient, for each taking the other as offensive to the survival of their credence.

French has long rests on the three mainstream institutions of public education, military services, and employment to assimilate migrants and to management of religious practices. Being a majority of migrants group in its master colony, Muslims fail in integrating themselves through these viable instruments. The percentage of Muslims who fail to finish secondary school is considerably higher than that of non-Muslim. By one estimate, 30% of young Algerian and 28% Moroccans are unemployed (Gallis, 2008).

While education levels are lowest among Muslims migrants, some minority Muslims groups has demanded public school to allow Muslim girls wearing a headscarf to class, certainly viewed in ridicule by the French government. Less mockery than this is the insistence of having female doctors to treat Muslim female patients in public hospitals. Logically these demands are judged to be illogical for the government to mend for, despite its cracked relations with migrants who had been convincingly unable to adjust themselves in the expected norms of French society (Gallis, 2008).

Yet, it is important to notice that even when

Muslims accept the republican ideal, this will not necessarily lead to their assimilation into French society. Citing Gallis in his 2005 CRS report to the Congress, studies find widespread discrimination against North Africans and other Muslims who seek employment in France. Few Muslims are visible in the top levels of French policies, media, the judiciary, business, and the civil services. Moreover, racist violence has been rising in France. In 2003 there were 232 recorded acts of violence against Muslims, and the number exceeded in the following year into 595 cases, for which the extreme right-wing groups, like National Front Party, are culpable (Gallis, 2008).

Muslims and Europe's Incessant Relations

As a category, Muslims in Europe can be seen as minority group as well as non-minority. To be seen as minority, explanation given above describes some of the many problems faced by Muslims migrants in Europe. Most of the research connotes the identity of Muslims became the stark identity of difference among the large majorities of Europeans. Nonetheless, this marking identity of religion is recognized as not a sole determining factor that gives cue to the estrangement of Muslims in Europe. Economic despondency coped by some Muslims migrant groups that came to some of European countries, such as Germany or France, as non-skilled labor, also create reasonable hit for disenfranchisement.

There is no exact number of Muslims population in European countries. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2004, issued by United States' Department of States, Muslims only make up a small segment of European population, no more than 5 percent out of more than 425 the whole populace. The report shows in detail that, within the EU, France has the largest Muslim population – as many

as 5 million people, most from North Africa, comprising about 8 percent of the country's total population. Germany, with up to 3.5 million, is come to the second largest group of Muslims, followed by England with 1.6 million and Spain and Italy with roughly 1 million each (the PEW, 2005). Meanwhile the 2005 CSR Report for the Congress cites the current Muslims population have reached approximately 20-25 million in European countries. They are composed of a number of European converts to Islam and indigenous Muslims population in European Union member countries, such as Turkey (Gallis, 2008). There is a probability of increase in this number, given that the fertility and birth rate among muslims women are three times higher than those of European women, which means that there is the a high probability that one day muslims population will outnumber the European population themselves (the PEW, 2005).

To be seen as minorities, therefore, is not necessarily accurate. Some minor findings describe the success story of Muslims personalities and/or families in Europe. Substantial Muslims population live in Germany, UK, France, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Belgium; while most Nordic and Central European countries have smaller Muslims population (Adamson, 2006; Anspaha, 2008; Wharton, 2008).

Muslims are the largest minorities in Europe and Islam is the fastest growing religion developed in Europe. This is fertile ground for minority-related issues, as seen by most Muslims defender, and majority-related concerns, as perceived by most European warden, become the hotbed of brazen agonies between the two poles and, ironically, find its course in finite point of political Islam. The term political Islam refers to a politicization of Islam, based on the deceitful fuse of religious expressions—which is

culturally bounded and historically draped with that of Islamic teaching—addressed in converse to serve a blasphemy at the cost of Islam as a tenet and Muslims as a collectivity or *umma* (Salvatore, 2007). Labeling political Islam to propose virulent actions, or Islamist to bring up actors loathe hostilities, by relating Islam as a tenet and a modality of subjectivities is, thus, a self-denying category (Halavi, 2008).

Put the issue of Islamic veil that sparked the debate, not only in France, but also in cities of Germany, UK, and Netherlands. The veil connotes the denial of public transparency, rather than a protective 'cover' or 'screen', which is closer to the meaning of hijab. Lack of historical and cultural detail, most Westerners, human rightists and feminists seen the practice as denigration, illicit, and—therefore—pinpoint the way Islam is perceived as a patriarchic in nature. On the other hand, the patriarch of Islam themselves oblige the use of hijab as a compulsory on grounds of sanctity, disregarding the coherent conscientious preference from the muslims women themselves (Salvatore, 2007).

The politicization of Islamic kept its pace since colonial era, through methods of ongoing rivalry and competition. Attempt to deliver a typology of political Islam, which is basically rest on contingent interests, viewpoints, and emotions, is parasitic for the least balanced and most essentialized view of the relations between obsolete Islam and modern Europe. The politicization of Islam is responded in a rather reactionary based, devoid of any mutual stand between the need to self-criticize and the need to Self-preserve the inner value of Islam as a tenet into Islam as a diehard ideology for most of Islamic defender. Reading in between, the politicization of Islam “depends not only on what Muslims do or do not do in their various form of collective action or

inaction, but also on the simultaneous and mutual construction of the imagined realities” between the Europe and the muslims (Salvatore, 2007). This is what particularly evident in the adjacent relations of European homeland nowadays. Demographic explosion, the fear of cultural backlash, and the prophecy of Islamic world to outwin the curvature historical trajectories of human life, have all tossed the panic that stepped into European public sphere.

Muslims migrants in Europe are naturally diverse in nationality, ethnic, language, and credo backgrounds. In Germany, Muslims from Turkey nationalities outnumber the others; in France, Muslims from Maghreb region in North Africa become the significant components of all Muslim population; and in Britain, the Muslims migrants are drafted from South Asia. It is noteworthy to keep in mind, however, that there will never be single, solid, and definite Muslim identities in each of European countries. While it is generic to see the disagreements among Muslims and European allies, it is common as well to accept that there might also be variance within Muslims themselves due to these cultural, religious tenet, and ethnical arrays.

The historical trajectories of Western European states have left institutional legacies, highly influenced by the church. Although secularism was put forward as the ideal institutional arrangement for European society, Europe cannot escape from its historical ties by which state and church inseparable. There is no need to argue that European tradition is established on the heritage of Judeo-Christian tradition. Even after the separation of church from the modern state system, adhere to the notion of secularism, religion was never put into the flipside of the structure (McCrea, 2007).

Adamson (2006) mentions, for

example, how religious education was given in public schools in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands; the edifice of national churches within the structure of England and Scotland; and the long-established attachment of Catholic Church with Italy and Spain. The Islam affair in Europe edifice splits a variance within this uniformity. This split was revealed once the rift broke into the surface, following the media event of Satanic Verses in Britain and *le foulard* in France during the 1980s (Salvatore, 2007). The event has raising debates among politicians and within the mass media in Britain and in France. There was a premise that Muslims may have different values from Europeans, which is incompatible to live by. It is precisely the perceived cultural incompatibility that has always become the building block for the construction of Muslims as “ethno-racial outsider” (Bleich, 2006) and the politicization of Islam (Halavi, 2006). The frantic Britain Muslim’s reaction during the Satanic Verses in Britain, for example, was also the uptight France government response in dealing with the issues of hijab.

While there seemed to be no room left for either of the parties to voice and express their stance leniently, discourse always offers its way out. Either the media has actually dealt with similar situation in such a scandalous or courteous manner, particular consideration on the role of the media in spiraling the information surely need to be questioned. While media become the machinery of cultural production for maintaining power, it is the discourse that had brought about cognizant and deliberate manner of postcolonial Others to unfetter themselves from the historical predicament. Take your pill: Discourse always finds its way home. The core problem of Muslims and European relations lays not only in the policy of positive discrimination as one might suggest,

but in a broad sphere of political, cultural, and socio-economic bonds, which is fixed in either the epistemic distortion, an ethno-centricism, a will to dominating, or all of these whims at once.

CONCLUSION

Muslims migrants become an issue in Europe only after there was wide violent actions taken against the political order and the social code underpinning the European institution. Muslims migrants have never been an issue prior to this manifested assault. Political Islam coined the term used by both sides who take differing combat positions.

Although investment has been made by European governments to provide mainstream agencies of cultural transmission, like education, economic employment, public services, and bridging social networks in the communities; but advocate to the affinity was narrowly taken. Adjacent to the many explanations proposed by the study on the Muslims migrants failure to integrate with the mainstream values, the parting compartment and moderation sanctioned by the mainstream institution has generated insolvency and destitution, and inflamed revolting passion. Historical trail guides the way the relations have been, and are continually, maintained by presumption and flawed deductions. While it is important to put right the issue of opportunity, mobilization, participation, and cohabitation; it is also worth to strive a tête-à-tête communication, exclusive of banishment and extermination.

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